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THE DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK UNDER
MONTANA'S PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
Robert C. Lukes"
The phrase "assumption of the risk" is an excellent illustration
of the extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A
phrase begins life as a literary expression, its felicity leads to
lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal for-
mula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and some-
times contradictory ideas.
- Justice Felix Frankfurter (1943)1
The doctrine of implied assumption of risk arose in the con-
text of negligence and historically provided a complete bar to
recovery when a party voluntarily encountered a known risk. In
the context of products liability, the majority of jurisdictions
follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement Second)
which provides that contributory negligence is not a defense to
an action based in strict liability in tort for a defective product.2
Indeed, because most states operated under the all or nothing
rules of contributory negligence at the time that Restatement
Second 402A swept the nation, the recognition of a defense that
would totally bar recovery contravened the general purposes
behind the recognition of strict liability in tort.3 In the context of
negligence, the assumption of risk is now typically subsumed
under comparative negligence. However, the defense has re-
tained its distinct character in actions for product defects based
in strict liability in tort. Generally, only two narrow defenses in
products liability law have emerged from the common law.4
* Associate with Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, Missoula, Montana. J.D.,
University of Montana School of Law, 1996. My thanks to Professor Carl Tobias.
1. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n. (1965); MARSHAL S.
SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 20.01[13][a][i] (3d ed. 1994); AMERICAN
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d § 1:83 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds., 1987). But
see, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978); West v. Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 454 N.E.2d
197 (Ill. 1983); Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 1978); Wil-
son v. B.F. Goodrich, 642 P.2d 644 (Or. 1982).
3. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 102, at 712 (5th ed. 1984). See generally Annotation, Effect of Adoption of Compar-
ative Negligence Rules on Assumption of Risk, 16 A.L.R.4TH 700 (1982).
4. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3; see, e.g., Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 904 P.2d 861, 864 (Ariz. 1995).
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These defenses are "misuse" and "assumption of risk."5
Montana law on products liability is generally in accord with
the foregoing statements concerning negligence and the assump-
tion of risk. In Montana, contributory negligence is not a defense
to a products liability action.' The assumption of risk was origi-
nally the only valid defense to a products liability action in Mon-
tana.7 The Montana Legislature codified the defense of misuse
in 1987.8 Thus, the available defenses in products liability ac-
tions in Montana generally accord with American jurisprudence.
Yet, the Montana Supreme Court's recent interpretation of these
defenses has placed the state's jurisprudence into a solitary posi-
tion among the many states.
This Article focuses on the assumption of risk as a defense
to products liability actions in Montana. In response to the 1987
statute, the Montana Supreme Court redefined the defense of
assumption of risk in Lutz v. National Crane Corp.9 This Article
discusses Lutz in light of the general rules regarding the as-
sumption of risk and the new statute.
In Part I, this Article discusses the evolution of the common
law doctrine of assumption of risk in the context of negligence
and products liability. Part II focuses on the Montana Supreme
Court's application of the doctrine of assumption of risk in prod-
ucts liability prior to its codification in 1987. Part III discusses
5. Recognize that these defenses were incorporated in the language of Justice
Traynor in the landmark products liability case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). In defining an action for a defective product
based on strict liability in tort, Justice Traynor wrote: "To establish the
manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured
while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a de-
fect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the
Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use." Id. at 901 (emphasis added). See generally
Robert E. Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61, 73 (1965).
6. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719 (1995).
7. See Zahrte v. Strum, Ruger & Co., Inc., 203 Mont. 90, 661 P.2d 17 (1983);
Brown v. North American Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711 (1978). Note that in
an early products liability case, the Montana Supreme Court upheld a summary
judgment for the defendant due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. See
Duncan v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 173 Mont. 382, 567 P.2d 936 (1977). In dissent, Justice
Shea criticized the court for allowing contributory negligence to operate to defeat the
claim, specifically relying on comment n to the Restatement Second argument that
only assumption of risk was a defense in products liability. See id. at 389-90, 567
P.2d at 940-41 (Shea, J., dissenting). This error by the court was clarified in Brown,
which acknowledged that contributory negligence is not a defense in products liability
actions and accepted the language from the Restatement Second. See Brown, 176
Mont. at 110-11, 765 P.2d at 719.
8. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(b) (1995).
9. 267 Mont. 368, 884 P.2d 455 (1994).
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the Montana statute concerning products liability and its effect
on assumption of risk. Part IV focuses on Lutz and discusses how
the Montana Supreme Court defined and applied the statutory
language of assumption of risk. Because the court intertwined
the defenses of assumption of risk and misuse in Lutz, this Arti-
cle also briefly discusses the alternative defense of misuse in
Part IV. In Part V, this Article further analyzes the supreme
court's treatment of the assumption of risk defense in products
liability actions and offers recommendations to both the court
and the legislature for possible future improvements.
I. THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK
A. Traditional Common Law & Assumption of Risk
As a defense to an allegation of negligence, the doctrine of
assumption of risk arose in the context of employer and employ-
ee relations. ° Courts traditionally recognized assumption of
risk in three circumstances: (1) by express consent; (2) from a
duty perspective; and (3) as a misconduct defense." First, by
contract the plaintiff may expressly consent to conduct that
would otherwise be considered negligent. 2 The second circum-
stance arises when a relation between the plaintiff and defen-
dant demonstrates that the plaintiff has knowledge that the
defendant will not provide protection from risks that arise in the
relation: in this circumstance it may be implied that the plaintiff
assumed the risk." The third circumstance occurs when a
plaintiff is cognizant of a risk created by the defendant, but
decides nevertheless to voluntarily engage in the activity, there-
by limiting the defendant's liability. 4 The focus of the assump-
tion of risk in the context of products liability arises under this
third form, i.e., the misconduct of the plaintiff. As Professor
10. See Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 194 Mont. 76, 82, 634
P.2d 653, 657 (1981). Because assumption of risk arose in the contractual context of
employer/employee, its application outside this relationship should be narrowly inter-
preted. See id.; see also Sweeney v. Matthews, 236 N.E.2d 439, 444-45 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968).
11. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 68.
12. See Robert E. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22
LA. L. REV. 122, 133-38 (1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
13. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 68 at 481.
14. See id. Professor Keeton also points out that the plaintiff consents to dan-
gers created by defendant in the past, not to future dangers. Thus, when a woman
walks out into a stream of traffic, one cannot imply that she has consented to have
the cars drive negligently and run her down. See id. at 484-85.
1997] 251
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Keeton wrote, "It is now generally recognized that the basis of
the defense is not contract but consent, and that it is available in
many cases where no express agreement exists." 5
Another important factor that distinguishes the assumption
of risk from ordinary comparative negligence arises out of this
concept of consent: the test for whether the plaintiff assumed the
risk is subjective.1" This contrasts with comparative negligence,
which prescribes an objective test for plaintiffs conduct based on
the standard of a reasonable person. However, under the doc-
trine of assumption of risk, the court focuses on the plaintiffs
actual knowledge, her appreciation of the risk or defect, and
whether she voluntarily encountered the risk. 7 Thus in this
context, the plaintiffs impressions at the time and general
knowledge of the risk are at issue.
B. Products Liability Law & the Assumption of Risk
Most jurisdictions recognize the assumption of risk as a
defense to an action based in strict liability in tort for a defective
product. After rejecting contributory negligence as a defense to
strict liability, one of the comments to section 402A of the Re-
statement Second states:
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which
consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encoun-
ter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of
assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the
defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it,
he is barred from recovery. 8
Many courts use this language from the Restatement Second to
define the assumption of risk in the context of products liabili-
ty. 9 Some courts have also used a three-part test to define as-
15. Id. at 484.
16. See John F. Vargo, Something Old and Something New: Defenses to Strict
Liability, TRIAL, Nov. 1979, at 48-49; Note, The Moment of Inadvertence Concept in
Strict Products Liability: The Seed of Destruction for the Assumption of Risk Defense?,
53 IND. L.J. 531, 534-35 (1978).
17. See Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict Products Liability, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 872, 873 (1982).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n. (1965). Again, note that
the Restatement Second was drafted during the era when contributory negligence act-
ed as a total bar to recovery.
19. See Comment, The Knowledge Element of Assumption of Risk as a Defense
[Vol. 58252
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sumption of risk:
(1) the plaintiff actually knew and appreciated the particular
risk or danger created by the defect;
(2) the plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk while realizing
the danger; and
(3) the plaintiffs decision to encounter the known risk was
unreasonable.'
One possible distinction between the doctrine of assumption
of risk in the context of products liability as compared with its
operation under negligence law lies in the subject matter of the
plaintiffs consent. 21 Under the common law defense of assump-
tion of risk in a negligence action, it was generally sufficient if
the plaintiff "fully [understood] a risk of harm to himself or his
things caused by the defendant's conduct."22 Yet, in the context
of products liability, courts may require the plaintiff to have
known of the specific defect in the product that created the dan-
ger.2 ' This requirement of specificity is reflected in the language
employed by the Restatement Second. However, the alternative
three-part test used by some courts appears to require only
knowledge of the risk created by the defect. Yet, in many juris-
dictions it is not enough that the plaintiff knew that the product
was generally dangerous. For assumption of risk to apply, the
plaintiff must have known that a specific defect rendered the
product dangerous and that the defect actually caused the inju-
ry.
24
to Strict Products Liability, 10 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 243, 243 (1977); Note,
Student Forum on the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 111,
149 (1980); see, e.g., Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1995);
Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d 1163 n. 9 (Cal. 1972); Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 565 P.2d
217, 222-23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Brown v. North American Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98,
576 P.2d 711 (1978); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 848 (N.H.
1978).
20. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 356 (Md. 1985); see also
Devaney v. Sarno, 311 A-2d 208, 210 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), affd per curi-
am, 323 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1974). See generally Nikki A. Westra, Restructuring the De-
fenses to Strict Products Liability-An Alternative to Comparative Negligence, 19 SAN-
TA CLARA L. REV. 355, 365-70 (1979).
21. Certainly this difference stems from the very character of a products liabil-
ity action. In strict liability in tort for a defective product, the enquiry focuses on the
nature of the defective product and not on the conduct whereby it was created.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965).
23. See, e.g., Howell v. Gould, Inc., 800 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1986); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 888-92 (Alaska 1979); Boyer v. Eljer Mfg., Inc.,
830 S.W.2d 535, 538-39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Keen v. Ashot Ashkelon, Ltd., 748
S.W.2d 91, 92-93 (Tex. 1988).
24. In fact, some courts may require that the plaintiff knew of the defect and
1997] 253
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Another interesting distinction arises in the assumption of
risk's historical application in the negligence arena. Under com-
mon law, a plaintiffs actions did not have to be unreasonable
before the defense could apply. A plaintiffs assumption of risk
that was reasonable may have limited recovery, so long as the
assumption was voluntary."5 More recently, courts have adopted
the position in negligence actions that the plaintiffs assumption
of risk must be unreasonable before the defense applies.26 This
modern development is even more pronounced in the area of
products liability. Most courts, in accord with the Restatement
Second, now require that the plaintiffs assumption of risk be
unreasonable.27
II. ASSUMPTION OF RISK UNDER MONTANA COMMON LAW
A. The Doctrine as Applied in Negligence Actions
The Montana Supreme Court has recognized the complex
nature of the doctrine of assumption of risk.21 Under the im-
plied assumption of risk, when a plaintiff "voluntarily encoun-
ter[s] a known risk which defendant has negligently allowed to
come into being, he relieves the defendant of liability."2' The
assumption of risk essentially applies when one voluntarily ex-
poses herself to a danger that she fully appreciates."0
appreciated the danger it presented. See Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d
516, 522 (Tenn. 1973). But see Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976). One should recognize that this area of the law suffers from slack lan-
guage, and courts may often simply refer to knowledge of the "risk" or the "danger"
with little or no analysis of the issue.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, 496C (1965); VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.1 (2d ed. 1986).
26. See, e.g., Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983); Barstow v. Kroger Co., 730 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1984); SCHWARTZ, supra note
25, § 9.1, at 156.
27. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text; see also Aaron D. Twerski,
Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability
Era, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1974); Curtis R. Calvert, Comment, The Knowledge Ele-
ment of Assumption of Risk as a Defense to Strict Products Liability, 10 J. MARSHALL
J. PRAC. & PROC. 243, 244 (1978).
28. See Kipp v. Willoughby, 161 Mont. 432, 436, 506 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1973).
29. Id. at 436, 506 P.2d at 1368.
30. See Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 194 Mont. 76, 82, 634 P.2d
653, 657 (1981). More specifically, the court has defined the elements of assumption
of risk in the context of negligence as:
(1) knowledge, actual or implied, of the particular condition creating the
risk;
(2) appreciation of this condition as dangerous;
(3) a voluntary remaining or continuing in the face of the known dangerous
6
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The supreme court has more recently ruled that the doctrine
of assumption of risk no longer operates as a separate defense to
negligence claims in Montana.31 The court held that the "con-
duct of the parties should be compared based upon evidence of
negligence and contributory negligence, as established by reason-
able and prudent person standards."32 Thus, in Montana, the
doctrine of assumption of risk in negligence actions has now
been entirely subsumed under comparative negligence.
The most significant remaining body of Montana law in
which the doctrine remains viable is in products liability law.3
The Montana Supreme Court recognized this defense prior to its
codification in 1987.' The court reasoned that it was appropri-
ate that the assumption of risk remain an independent and via-
ble defense in this limited area of products liability because
contributory negligence was not available.35
B. The Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Prior to
Codification in Montana
This section will chronologically review the common law
doctrine of assumption of risk as discussed by the Montana Su-
preme Court in all six cases which addressed the issue over a
period of fifteen years.
The Montana Supreme Court first addressed the assumption
of risk in the context of products liability law in Brown v. North
American Manufacturing Co.3" In Brown, the issue of assump-
tion of risk arose because the defendant claimed that the danger
in the product was open and obvious. The supreme court relied
condition; and
(4) injury resulting as the usual and probable consequence of the dangerous
condition.
See Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 500, 610 P.2d 668, 683
(1980); Dean v. First Natl Bank of Great Falls, 152 Mont. 474, 480-81, 452 P.2d
402, 405 (1969); Hanson v. Colgrove, 152 Mont. 161, 164, 447 P.2d 486, 488 (1968).
31. See Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 477, 872 P.2d 782, 790 (1994);
Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field Serv., Inc., 200 Mont. 205, 209, 650 P.2d 772, 775
(1982).
32. Mead, 264 Mont. at 477, 872 P.2d at 790.
33. The doctrine of assumption of risk remains viable in the context of strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities. See Matkovic v. Shell Oil Co., 218 Mont.
156, 160, 707 P.2d 2, 4 (1985).
34. See Zahrte v. Strum, Ruger & Co., 203 Mont. 90, 661 P.2d 17 (1983).
35. See id. at 93, 661 P.2d at 18.
36. 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711 (1978). But see supra note 7 discussing an ear-
ly Montana products liability case which recognized contributory negligence as a
defense.
1997] 255
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on the Restatement Second and supporting case law to hold that
"[t]he fact that a danger is patent does not prevent a finding the
[sic] product is in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous
to the particular plaintiff."37 The court recognized that the open
or patent character of a defect was not conclusive, but only a
factor to be considered in its analysis of the assumption of the
risk.38
In Brown, the court analyzed the doctrine of assumption of
risk in terms of "proximate cause," noting that the plaintiffs
conduct could break the chain of causation.39 Relying on the
language from the Restatement Second, the supreme court recog-
nized that the assumption of risk is a defense in products liabili-
ty actions. Expanding upon the Restatement Second language,
the court noted that "[i]n addition to realizing the existence of
the defect or danger and voluntarily doing an act which exposes
him to it, the plaintiff must perceive and appreciate the risk in-
volved, i.e., the probability of harm."'
The court also explicitly noted that the defense is based
upon a subjective standard. To articulate this standard, the
Montana Supreme Court quoted at length from a federal district
court in Pennsylvania, which stated:
The standard to be applied is a subjective one, of what the
particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and appre-
ciates. In this it differs from the objective standard which is
applied to contributory negligence .... If by reason of age, or
lack of information, experience, intelligence, or judgment, the
plaintiff does not understand the risk involved in a known
situation, he will not be taken to assume the risk, although it
may be found that his conduct is contributory negligence be-
cause it does not conform to the community standard of the
reasonable man.41
The supreme court explained that the Restatement Second re-
quires "a showing of knowledge of the danger which is subjective,
37. Brown, 176 Mont. at 108, 576 P.2d at 717.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 110, 576 P.2d at 719. This language is unusual for two reasons:
(1) assumption of risk is typically not couched in terms of causation; and (2) the
.chain of causation" description is usually reserved for analysis of cause-in-fact. Since
the court does not generally rely upon this particular analysis in later cases, the
unusual context in which this doctrine arises in Montana products jurisprudence will
be ignored.
40. Id. at 111, 576 P.2d at 719 (quoting Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753,
765 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
41. Id. at 111-12, 576 P.2d at 719.
256 [Vol. 58
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conscious and personal to the plaintiff."42 Acknowledging the
burden that this requirement placed on defendants, the court
provided that defendants may use circumstantial evidence to
prove these subjective elements.'
The Montana Supreme Court in Brown thoroughly intro-
duced and discussed the doctrine of assumption of risk in prod-
ucts liability cases." The court included the primary consider-
ations regarding assumption of risk in its analysis. The court's
reliance upon comment "n" of the Restatement Second placed it
in accord with most jurisdictions. Furthermore, the discussion of
the subjective character of the defense was quite exhaustive. The
only two points missing from the Brown opinion were: (1) wheth-
er the plaintiff's knowledge must be of the danger, the defect, or
both; and (2) whether the assumption of the risk must be unrea-
sonable.45 The supreme court resolved these issues in later cas-
es.
The Brown court's reasoning and conclusion are correct.
Whether a defect is open and obvious is an issue of contributory
negligence, which is based on the standards of a reasonable user
of the product. Because contributory negligence is not an avail-
able defense in products liability, it would be an error to consider
this question. The only relevant inquiry remaining is whether
the plaintiff had subjective knowledge of the defect." In this
context, a court could appropriately consider the open and obvi-
ous character of the defect as circumstantial evidence of the
42. Id. at 112, 576 P.2d at 719-20 (1978) (relying on Jackson v. Coast Paint &
Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974)). The court additionally noted that jury in-
structions for the assumption of risk must use the subjective standard, and these
instructions should not employ the words "actual" or "implied" when referring to the
plaintiff's knowledge. See id. at 114, 576 P.2d at 721.
43. See id. at 112, 576 P.2d at 720 (relying on Sperling v. Hatch, 88 Cal. Rptr.
704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)).
44. It is interesting to note the significant number of national treatises on prod-
ucts liability that refer to Montana case law in the context of assumption of risk and
the Brown case in particular.
45. Justice Shea, in his special concurrence, points out this defect in the majori-
ty opinion. He claims that the majority failed by not including the additional require-
ment that the plaintiff's conduct in assuming the risk was unreasonable. See Brown,
176 Mont. at 119-22, 576 P.2d at 723-25 (Shea, J., concurring).
One should note that the majority opinion did identify the question, "[w]as it
unreasonable for plaintiff to act as he did?" Id. at 112, 576 P.2d at 720. However,
because the court determined that inadequate evidence was presented that the plain-
tiff had actual knowledge and appreciation of the danger, it apparently never reached
this question. See id. at 112-13, 576 P.2d at 720.
46. The open and obvious character of the defect should not be an issue in
whether the product was "misused."
9
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plaintiffs knowledge of the defect.
The Montana Supreme Court next analyzed the issue of
assumption of risk in products liability law in Kopischke v. First
Continental Corp.47 After noting the subjective standard applied
in Brown, the court initially held that when the plaintiff pur-
chased an automobile with an "as is" clause, she did not contrac-
tually assume the risk of the defect.' The supreme court recog-
nized that a person must have "knowledge of the particular con-
dition that creates such risk" to assume the risk, and the "as is"
clause was insufficient for this purpose.49
However, after resolving the issue at bar, the supreme court
attempted to clarify the doctrine of assumption of risk in light of
Montana's recent adoption of comparative negligence." The
plaintiff essentially contended that assumption of risk is part of
contributory negligence and is, therefore, within the ambit of the
comparative negligence statute.5' The defendant claimed that
assumption of risk is an independent defense and could, there-
fore, still act as a total bar to recovery.52 After a rather long
analysis, the court in dicta noted that "we will follow the modern
trend and treat assumption of the risk like any other form of
contributory negligence and apportion it under the comparative
negligence statute.""
Despite Kopischke, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certi-
fied the following question to the Montana Supreme Court sever-
al years later in Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. :' "Does the
defense of assumption of risk still exist as a complete bar to
plaintiffs recovery in a products liability action in the State of
Montana?""5 Although the dicta in Kopischke had answered this
question, the question arose again in response to subsequent
developments in related case law. In the year after Kopischke,
the Montana Supreme Court abolished the implied assumption
of risk as a defense in negligence actions, assuming it under
comparative negligence.56 Thus, the question remained whether
47. 187 Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980).
48. See Kopischke, 187 Mont. at 501, 610 P.2d at 684.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 501-07, 610 P.2d at 684-87.
51. See id. at 501, 610 P.2d at 684.
52. See id. at 501-02, 610 P.2d at 684.
53. Id. at 507, 610 P.2d at 687.
54. 203 Mont. 90, 661 P.2d 17 (1983).
55. Zahrte, 203 Mont. at 91, 661 P.2d at 17.
56. See id. at 92-93, 661 P.2d at 18 (referring to Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field
Serv., Inc., 200 Mont. 205, 650 P.2d 772 (1982)).
258 [Vol. 58
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assumption of risk was a viable defense in products liability and,
if so, whether it was apportioned under the rules of comparative
negligence or was independent of the statutory apportionment
and could still act as a total bar to the plaintiffs recovery.
In Zahrte, the supreme court answered the certified question
by noting that assumption of risk is different in products liability
actions and that it does constitute a defense separate from con-
tributory negligence.57 Because the defense is based on a subjec-
tive standard, with a significant burden on the defendant, it is
an appropriate defense in products liability actions. The court
seized the opportunity to restate and perhaps modify the doc-
trine of assumption of risk in Montana: "Plaintiff must have a
subjective knowledge of the danger and then voluntarily and
unreasonably expose himself to that danger before assumption of
risk will become operative in a strict liability case."58 Finally,
the court in Zahrte declared that assumption of risk is a viable
defense in strict liability actions, but it must be compared
against the conduct of the defendant.59
Only a few months later, in autumn of 1983, the Montana
Supreme Court returned to the issue in Kuiper v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co." As in Brown, the court considered the effect of
the "open and obvious danger" of the product.61 The court relied
upon Brown and reiterated that the open and obvious character
of a defect was merely a factor to consider in deciding whether
the plaintiff assumed the risk. After a somewhat confusing anal-
ysis, the supreme court in Kuiper held:
[T]he only duty imposed on the user is to act reasonably with
respect to the product which he knows to be defective and dan-
gerous. It is only when the user unreasonably proceeds to use a
product which he knows to be defective and dangerous, that he
violates this duty and relinquishes the law.62
57. See id. at 94, 661 P.2d at 19.
58. Id. at 93-94, 661 P.2d at 18-19. Note the alteration in the court's definition
by explicitly requiring that the conduct be unreasonable. See id. at 94, 661 P.2d at
19 (Gulbrandson, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 94, 661 P.2d at 19.
60. 207 Mont. 37, 673 P.2d 1208 (1983).
61. Kuiper, 207 Mont. at 58, 673 P.2d at 1219-20. Apparently this issue arose
in Kuiper because of the age of the product. See id. at 43, 62-63, 673 P.2d at 1212,
1222. The supreme court again refers to the assumption of risk in the context of
proximate cause. See id. at 59, 673 P.2d at 1220. This analysis does not appear to
be particularly helpful and, as noted, has apparently been abandoned by the court in
more recent years.
62. Id. at 63-64, 673 P.2d at 1222.
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The court's reasoning in Kuiper had the potential to alter again
the assumption of risk. In addition to focusing on the unreason-
able character of the user's conduct, the court indicated that the
product user must have knowledge of both the defect and the
danger." However, later case law in Montana ignored this dis-
tinction, and furthermore, it was altered by statute in 1987.
The supreme court returned to the issue of assumption of
risk five years later when it decided Krueger v. General Motors
Corp.' Although the court's decision in Krueger arose after the
Montana legislature enacted its products liability law, the cause
of action accrued before the statute took effect.6" In Krueger, the
Plaintiff injured himself after he disengaged the front drive shaft
on a truck he was attempting to repair. The truck rolled down
an incline, severely injuring the plaintiff.66 The Krueger decision
addressed whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury
regarding the affirmative defense of assumption of risk."
The trial court submitted a jury instruction which required
the defendant to prove three basic elements in order to establish
the defense of assumption of risk: "(1) that the plaintiff knew
before the injury that the truck would roll; (2) that the plaintiff
voluntarily encountered the danger knowing this; and (3) that
the plaintiff unreasonably exposed himself to that danger.""
The defense argued that this instruction essentially required
that the plaintiff have a death wish for the jury to apply the
assumption of risk.69 The Montana Supreme Court disagreed.
After noting that Montana had accepted the assumption of risk
as enunciated by the Restatement Second and the applicable
subjective standard, the court analyzed the jury instructions
employed at the trial level.70 The court acknowledged that the
plaintiff must have known that the truck would roll.71 However,
63. This would have returned Montana to the position of the Restatement Sec-
ond. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
64. 240 Mont. 266, 783 P.2d 1340 (1989).
65. See Lutz v. National Crane Corp., 267 Mont. 368, 389, 884 P.2d 455, 467
(1994) (Gray. J., dissenting) (discussing the effective date of the statute and the
Krueger decision). Justice Gray also asserted that there was no evidence in the
legislative history of legislative intent that the statute codify the decision in Krueger.
See id. at 389, 884 P.2d at 467-68.
66. See Krueger, 240 Mont. at 269, 783 P.2d at 1342.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 275-76, 783 P.2d at 1346.
69. See id. at 276, 783 P.2d at 1346.
70. See id. at 276-77, 783 P.2d at 1346-47.
71. See id. at 277, 783 P.2d at 1347.
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the court emphasized that the plaintiff was not required to have
knowledge of the specific injuries which would result.72 Rather,
the instruction simply required that the plaintiff have knowledge
of the danger which the trial court articulated according to the
specific facts of the case.73 Although the Montana Supreme
Court expressed a preference for the Montana pattern instruc-
tions as used by the court in Zahrte, the court found no error in
the instruction used at the trial level in Krueger.74
The final case that the Montana Supreme Court decided
under the common law defense was Greytak v. Rego Co.75
Greytak concerned a defective valve on a propane tank at a resi-
dence in Winnett, Montana. 6 Despite knowing that the tank
was leaking and pinpointing the defect to a leaky valve, the
plaintiff returned to the gas-filled basement several times before
an explosion occurred.77 The main issue presented in the case
was whether proving the assumption of risk required that the
plaintiff have knowledge of the danger or the actual defect pres-
ent in the product.78
The Montana Supreme Court held in Greytak that the plain-
tiff was not required "to know of the specific defect before the
defense of assumption of risk became operative."79 The court
distinguished knowledge of the defect from knowledge of the
"particular condition that constituted the danger."" The jury in-
struction used by the trial court required the defendant to show
that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the danger.8 The
court held that this was the correct instruction, and that Mon-
tana law does not require that the plaintiff know of the actual
defect which caused the danger.8" Thus, in Greytak, the su-
72. See id. at 277, 783 P.2d at 1347. The court stated, "[iln order for GM to
assert the defense, Krueger must have had subjective or actual knowledge that the
truck would roll. This does not require that he have knowledge of the severity of the
injuries he would suffer." Id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. 257 Mont. 147, 848 P.2d 483 (1993). Although the case was presented to
the court long after the statute was enacted in 1987, the tort accrued in 1986 and
the statute did not apply. See id. at 149, 848 P.2d at 485.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 150, 848 P.2d at 485.
78. See id. at 151-53, 848 P.2d at 485-87. Recall that Kopischke indicated that
the plaintiff must have knowledge of both. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying
text.
79. Greytak, 257 Mont. at 151, 848 P.2d at 486.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 152, 848 P.2d at 486-87.
82. See id. at 153, 848 P.2d at 487.
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preme court allowed the more general showing of awareness of
the danger to defeat the plaintiffs claim.'
The decision in Greytak is the last case that arose under the
common law defense and represents the supreme court's final
statement on the assumption of risk prior to the legislature's
modification of the law. Greytak essentially follows the analysis
used by most jurisdictions in requiring a subjective standard and
that the plaintiffs act of encountering the danger be unreason-
able. However, the court departed from the majority of jurisdic-
tions when it required that the plaintiff only have general knowl-
edge of the danger. As noted, the more widely accepted rule
declares that the plaintiff must have specific knowledge of the
actual defect which creates the danger and voluntarily encounter
the danger. Although the difference may not be significant in
some cases, it certainly lessens the burden on the defendant, as
evidenced by the result in Greytak.
However, this standard enunciated in Greytak was short-
lived. As noted, the legislature intervened in 1987 and changed
the common law defense of the assumption of risk in Montana.
III. MONTANA'S PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTE
In 1987, the Montana legislature enacted a law to "clarify"
products liability actions (the products liability statute)." The
first section of the statute repeats verbatim the core language
concerning the defective product from section 402A of the Re-
statement Second.85 The products liability statute also clarifies
the concept of "tracing" with regards to defects that result from
improper design rather than manufacturing defect.8" However,
the most significant contribution of the statute is the codification
of the affirmative defenses available in a products liability ac-
tion.87
Montana's products liability statute, in accord with prior
case law and the Restatement Second, recognizes that contribu-
83. See id. at 152-53, 848 P.2d at 486-87. The court then reversed the lower
court's order for a new trial. See id. at 155-56, 848 P.2d at 488-89.
84. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719 (1995) (corresponds to An Act to Clarify
the Law Relating to Products Liability and Defining Two Defenses Available in Prod-
ucts Liability Cases, 1987, § 1, Ch. 466).
85. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-719(1), (2) (1995).
86. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(4) (1995). In order to "trace" the defect,
the plaintiff must prove that the defect existed at the time the product left the man-
ufacturer.
87. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5) (1995).
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tory negligence is not a defense in this arena.88 The statute pre-
scribes exactly which defenses are available in Montana: (1) a
modified form of assumption of risk;89 and (2) the defense of
misuse of the product.9 ° Although the defense of misuse is
largely beyond the scope of this Article, one should note that this
defense had not previously been recognized by the Montana Su-
preme Court." Thus, one of the most significant impacts of the
statute is certainly the addition of the defense of misuse to Mon-
tana products liability law.92
The first statutory defense relies on the concept of assump-
tion of risk. Although the legislature invoked this concept in the
statute, it avoided using the phrase "assumption of risk."9 3 The
pertinent part of the statute, defining the affirmative defense
commonly referred to as assumption of risk, states that the de-
fense will apply when "[tihe user or consumer of the product
discovered the defect or the defect was open and obvious and the
user or consumer unreasonably made use of the product and was
injured by it."' The statutory language provides for a three-
part test, the first part of which may be satisfied if either of two
conditions are met. 5 First, either the user or consumer must
have "discovered" the defect, or the defect must have been "open
and obvious."96 Second, the user or consumer must have "unrea-
sonably made use of' the product.97 Third, this use must have
"caused or contributed to" the injury.9"
Several aspects of the statutory language warrant discus-
sion. The potential changes in the law under the first part are
the most significant. The first sub-section of the first part pres-
ents nothing controversial: the language "discovered the defect"
essentially codifies the subjective test that focuses on the user's
88. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5) (1995).
89. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) (1995).
90. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(b) (1995).
91. But see Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093
(D. Mont. 1981). The United States District Court of Montana recognized that the
Montana Supreme Court had never applied the defense of misuse in a products lia-
bility case. See id. at 1097. Despite this recognition, the federal court held that mis-
use was a defense, defining its scope in reference to foreseeable misuses. See id. at
1097-98.
92. See Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees Inc., 264 Mont. 1, 870 P.2d 51 (1994).
93. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719 (1995).
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) (1995).
95. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5) (1995).
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) (1995) (emphasis added).
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(b) (1995) (emphasis added).
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(b) (1995) (emphasis added).
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or consumer's knowledge of the defect.99 However, close analysis
of the first part reveals two significant alterations in the existing
defense of assumption of risk.
One significant change in the first part of the statute con-
cerns the subject-matter of the plaintiffs knowledge. The statute
now explicitly requires knowledge of the defect."°° Thus, the
statute has effectively overruled Greytak."'0 Mere knowledge or
discovery of the danger created by the defect should no longer be
sufficient to allow the defense to apply.' °2 This is somewhat
surprising given that the bill was likely sponsored by business
interests motivated to reduce defendant's liabilities for product
defects. Recognizing the motivation behind the law leads one to
conclude that this alteration was unintentional.
However, because the first part of the statute is drafted in
the disjunctive form, the defense may apply even if the plaintiff
did not discover the defect. The statute provides that an affirma-
tive defense may exist where the "defect was open and obvi-
ous." This language in the second sub-section of the first part
is a dramatic shift from prior Montana case law. Significantly,
this sub-section makes no reference to the knowledge of the user
or consumer. Therefore, the statutory language apparently con-
templates an objective test to determine whether the defect was
open and obvious to a reasonably prudent person. This contra-
venes the generally accepted jurisprudence of most states and
essentially reverses Montana case law dating back to Brown v.
North American Manufacturing Co.' 4 As previously noted,
Brown held that:
The fact that a danger is patent does not prevent a finding the
product is in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to
the particular plaintiff. Rather, the obvious character of a de-
99. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) (1995).
100. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) (1995).
101. The Montana Supreme Court foreshadowed this change even in Greytak.
When discussing the knowledge required of the plaintiff, the court stated, "At the
time Greytak's cause of action accrued, it was not necessary for a plaintiff to know
of the specific defect before the defense of assumption of risk became operative."
Greytak, 257 Mont. at 151, 848 P.2d at 486.
102. Whether the burden is greater to show that a plaintiff knew of a defect or
knew of the danger is fact specific. Although the discussion generally concludes that
the burden is greater to show knowledge of a defect, this may not always be the
case. Note that the language of the Restatement Second requires that the plaintiff
must "discover the defect and [be] aware of the danger." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n. (1965).
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) (1995).
104. 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711 (1978).
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fect or danger is but a factor to be considered in determining
whether the plaintiff in fact assumed the risk.'0 5
Thus, the inclusion of the "open and obvious" language shifts the
test from a purely subjective viewpoint under prior Montana case
law to an objective focus on the character of the product to deter-
mine whether the defect was so patent that the plaintiffs knowl-
edge of the defect should be constructively implied.
The statutory language in the second part of the test is also
notable. The statute now clearly requires that plaintiffs use of
the product must be unreasonable for the defense to apply, thus
resolving any prior ambiguities.' 6 This language provides for
an objective test as to whether the plaintiffs use of the product
with knowledge of the defect violates the conduct of a reasonably
prudent person. Although the Montana Supreme Court had oscil-
lated on this point in the past, the court has required this ele-
ment in its more recent decisions. Furthermore, this position is
in accord with the majority of jurisdictions and the Restatement
Second.
The language in this section is notable also for its use of the
phrase "made use of the product."' ' Typically under the as-
sumption of risk, plaintiffs act of encountering the product with
a particularized subjective knowledge must have been unreason-
able. Similar language is found in comment n of the Restatement
Second.0 8 However, as we shall see, the Montana Supreme
Court's later interpretation of this phrase proved significant in
limiting the application of the defense. The court's decision to
refer to the "use" in this section of the statute creates a point of
potential confusion between this altered assumption of risk de-
fense and the defense of misuse. Potentially, the two defenses
may be merged into one with the entire focus on the reasonable-
ness of the use."°
105. Brown, 176 Mont. at 108, 576 P.2d at 717. The Montana Supreme Court
has consistently followed this rule that patent defects are merely a factor in the
plaintiffs subjective knowledge under assumption of risk. See, e.g., Sternberg v.
Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123, 132, 576 P.2d 725, 730-31 (1978).
106. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) (1995).
107. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) (1995). Note that similar language is
present in comment n of the Restatement Second. See supra text accompanying note
18.
108. See supra text accompanying note 18.
109. See infra Part IV.B. Perhaps in its decision to expand the traditional as-
sumption of risk defense to include a partially objective test, the legislature attempt-
ed too drastic a revision-one that could not practicably be incorporated in one sec-
tion of the statute.
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Thus, although the legislature entitled the bill "An Act Clar-
ifying the Law Relating to Products Liability Actions; Defining
Two Defenses Available in Products Liability Case; and Provid-
ing an Immediate Effective Date," "o the statute clearly altered
the law in Montana. This is illustrated by the fact that the stat-
ute avoided reference to "assumption of risk." Clearly, the most
significant alteration in the assumption of risk is the change
from a purely subjective test to a test which includes an objective
focus on the open and obvious character of the product.
This Article now turns to the Montana Supreme Court's
application of this affirmative defense after the 1987 statute. For
ease of discussion, this Article continues to refer to the statutory
defense as "assumption of risk," despite the legislature's avoid-
ance of this term."'
IV. THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE
STATUTORY DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The Montana Supreme Court has considered only two prod-
ucts liability cases under the new products liability statute.1
2
The first case was Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees Inc. 113
A. Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees Inc.
In Hart-Albin, the court focused on the defense of mis-
use."" Although this Article has generally avoided discussing
this alternative defense, for reasons that will soon become appar-
ent, it is now necessary to discuss briefly the defense of misuse.
110. S.B. 380, 50th Cong., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1987).
111. Note that the Montana Supreme Court has likewise chosen to continue
using the term "assumption of risk" for this section of the statutory defense. See
Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees Inc., 264 Mont. 1, 5, 870 P.2d 51, 53 (1994); Lutz v. Nat'l
Crane Corp., 267 Mont. 368, 377, 884 P.2d 455, 460 (1994).
112. The Montana Supreme Court also briefly noted the statute in Papp v.
Rocky Mountain Oil & Minerals, 236 Mont. 330, 340, 769 P.2d 1249, 1255 (1989).
The relevant issue in Papp was whether a building was a product for purposes of
products liability law. See id. at 334, 769 P.2d at 1252. The affirmative defense of
assumption of risk was not addressed by the court.
The United States District Court of Montana was also presented with one no-
table case since the effective date of the statute. See Estate of Weaselboy v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 10 Mont. Fed. Rep. 41 (D. Mont. 1991). The court in Weaselboy
held that the Montana law does not permit the jury to apportion damages in a
products liability action to an employer who is immune under the Workers' Compen-
sation Act. See id. at 50. Although the court briefly discussed the statute, the opin-
ion largely concerns evidentiary questions beyond the scope of this Article.
113. 264 Mont. 1, 870 P.2d 51 (1994).
114. See Hart-Albin, 264 Mont. at 4-7, 870 P.2d at 53-54.
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The Montana products liability statute provides that an affirma-
tive defense is available when "[t]he product was unreasonably
misused by the user or consumer and such misuse caused or con-
tributed to the injury.""5 The classic scenario to illustrate mis-
use depicts a lawnmower used as a hedgetrimmer."
The allegedly defective product in Hart-Albin was an electri-
cal cord which caused a fire in the plaintiff's department
store."7 The defendants claimed that the cord was misused by
the plaintiffs in two ways: (1) it was inappropriately
misassembled; and (2) it was used in a flammable display."' In
Hart-Albin, the court stated that it would define the term "un-
reasonably misused" according to its generally accepted use in
products liability law."9
The general rule of the defense of misuse is that "a manu-
facturer is not responsible for injuries resulting from abnormal
or unintended use of a product if such use was not reasonably
foreseeable." 120 The supreme court in Hart-Albin stressed the
importance of foreseeability in ascertaining what constituted un-
reasonable misuse.'2 ' Foreseeability is the central focus in the
defense of misuse. If the misuse was reasonably foreseeable, it
was not a misuse; whereas, if the misuse was reasonably unfore-
seeable, the plaintiffs use of the product was an unreasonable
misuse, providing a viable defense. 22
This analysis accords with the general jurisprudence of mis-
use. The only effective means to distinguish misuse from ordi-
nary use is to apply standards of reasonableness which inevita-
bly are defined in the context of foreseeability' and whether a
115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(b) (1995). The defendants in Hart-Albin
claimed that because the alleged defect was a failure to warn, the range of defenses
was not limited by the statute. See Hart-Albin, 264 Mont. at 5, 870 P.2d at 53. The
court disagreed and held that regardless of the asserted defect, because the action
was based on strict liability in tort, the defenses were limited by those provided in
section 27-1-719 of the Montana Code. See id. at 5, 870 P.2d at 53.
116. See, e.g., id.
117. See id. at 3, 870 P.2d at 52.
118. See id. at 5, 870 P.2d at 53.
119. See id. at 6, 870 P.2d at 53-54.
120. Id. at 6, 870 P.2d at 53 (citing Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1097 (D. Mont. 1981)).
Courts have identified two types of misuse: (1) the use of a product for an
improper purpose, e.g., using a power saw for a nail clipper; and (2) the use of a
product in an improper manner, e.g., using a forklift on a steep incline. See generally
Jurado v. Western Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1318 (N.J. 1993).
121. See Hart-Albin, 264 Mont. at 6, 870 P.2d at 53-54.
122. See id.
123. Ironically, the business forces behind adoption of Montana product liability
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reasonable manufacturer could foresee the particular use of the
product. Using an objective standard based on foreseeability is
also appropriate because it furthers the policies behind adopting
strict liability in tort for product defects. This standard does not
penalize the diligent manufacturer who investigates possible
misuses. However, a subjective standard which focused on what
a particular manufacturer had foreseen would encourage compa-
nies to avoid investigation of possible misuses, thereby greatly
increasing potential defects.
The supreme court in Hart-Albin considered both asserted
claims of misuse separately. Concerning the first alleged misuse
of the product, the defendant conceded that the product could be
misassembled. Because of this admission, the court held that the
defendant had foreseen this particular misuse, and it was there-
by improper for the trial court to have presented the jury with a
misuse defense instruction. 24 The supreme court also held that
because the second alleged misuse of the product was so incorpo-
rated with the concept of misassembly, the alternative misuse
defense was precluded by the foreseeability of the misassembl-
y.' Thus, the court allowed neither defense of misuse in Hart-
Albin.
As noted, the Montana Supreme Court's definition of misuse
comports with the generally accepted rule.'26 The prevailing
jurisprudence recognizes that the product design must survive
the "foreseeable consequences of misuse," and that "foreseeable
use includes any particular use which should be known to a rea-
sonably prudent manufacturer."'27 Thus, although the defense
of misuse and assumption of risk are somewhat intertwined, it is
critical to note that the concept of misuse focuses on an objective
standard of what a prudent manufacturer could foresee.
This crucial point indicates how the court in Hart-Albin
erred. The court found dispositive the defendants' concession
that it foresaw the possibility of this misuse and removed the
law attempted to avoid any reference to "foreseeability." They contended that this
narrowed the defense of misuse beyond reason. See Written Testimony of American
Insurance Association of Senate Bill 380: Meeting of House Judiciary Comm., 50th
Cong., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1987). Despite the legislature striking the term foreseeabili-
ty from the statute, the court has read this term back into it via the requirement of
unreasonableness.
124. See Hart-Albin, 264 Mont. at 6-7, 870 P.2d at 54.
125. See id. at 7, 870 P.2d at 54.
126. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY T 21.01-.02(3)
(3d ed. 1994).
127. Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 799-800 (8th Cir. 1976).
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question from the jury as a matter of law. However, the effect of
the defendants' admission should have been more limited. In
remaining true to an objective test, the admission should only
have been a factor in the jury's determination of whether the
misuse was reasonably foreseeable by a prudent manufacturer.
Although the circumstances may be rare in which a manufactur-
er goes beyond the duty of a reasonably prudent manufacturer,
the test should be correctly structured.
128
B. Lutz v. National Crane Corp.
The second case in which the Montana Supreme Court ap-
plied the affirmative statutory defenses is Lutz v. National Crane
Corp.129 The supreme court's opinion in Lutz provides the most
recent and comprehensive statement concerning the statutory
defenses of misuse and the assumption of risk in Montana. 3 '
Because the court integrally intertwined these defenses, its dis-
cussion of misuse is noted here in order to fully appreciate the
court's analysis of assumption of risk.
In Lutz, the plaintiffs spouse was electrocuted when a
crane's cable, which was sideloading steel pipes, hit a power line
above the crane. 3' The plaintiff claimed that because the crane
did not have an insulated link to prevent electrocution it was
defectively designed. 3 2 The defendant in Lutz argued that the
decedent misused the crane by sideloading the pipes and that
the statutory defense of misuse should limit recovery. 3 The
128. A manufacturer might be so diligent as to consider and "foresee" many
more potential "misuses" than the reasonably prudent manufacturer. This type of
diligence by a manufacturer should not be discouraged by a court. The holding in
both Hart-Albin and Lutz encourages manufacturers to wear blinders so that they
may claim that they did not foresee that particular misuse. One policy behind ac-
cepting strict liability in tort for products defects is to force responsibility on manu-
facturers to ensure that they create safe products in the future. Both Hart-Albin and
Lutz militate against that broader policy.
129. 267 Mont. 368, 884 P.2d 455 (1994).
130. The opinion in Lutz is one of the last opinions authored by Justice Harrison
before his retirement. Recall that Justice Harrison also wrote the court's opinion for
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268
(1973), where the Montana Supreme Court first adopted strict liability in tort under
§ 402A of the Restatement Second.
131. See Lutz, 267 Mont. at 372, 884 P.2d at 457.
132. See id. at 373, 884 P.2d at 457.
133. See id. at 373-74, 884 P.2d at 458. The jury in Lutz apportioned 20% of the
liability to the decedent. See id. at 371, 884 P.2d at 457. The Montana Supreme
Court reversed this determination and ordered the trial court to reinstate the jury's
full verdict. See id. at 389, 884 P.2d at 467.
1997] 269
21
Lukes: The Defense of Assumption of Risk
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1997
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
supreme court in Lutz relied upon its interpretation of misuse as
stated in Hart-Albin, focusing on the foreseeability of the mis-
use.134 Because the court found the manufacturer in Lutz had
reasonably foreseen the misuse of sideloading, the court held
that the defense of misuse was not available as a matter of
law. 13
5
The supreme court in Lutz focused on two facets of the mis-
use: (1) the knowledge of the manufacturer; and (2) the reason-
able foreseeability of the misuse. First, the court indicated, as in
Hart-Albin, that where "the party asserting the unreasonable
misuse defense acknowledges the foreseeability of the misuse,
then, as a matter of law, it is improper for the court to submit
that issue for determination to the trier of fact."136 Second, the
court noted that because sideloading was not uncommon, this
type of use was reasonably foreseeable and, hence, a reasonable
misuse. 131
The first part of the court's analysis is essentially identical
to its treatment of misuse in Hart-Albin and accordingly evidenc-
es the same mistake. By the court's own definition, the defense
of misuse implies an objective test based on a reasonableness
standard. Under such a test, the subjective foreseeability of the
use by the particular manufacturer should be of more limited
relevance. The correct procedure would have been to present the
test to the trier of fact to determine whether this use was fore-
seeable and therefore reasonable."' As noted, although the
defendant's knowledge of this type of use may be a factor in
determining whether the misuse was reasonably foreseeable, it
should not entirely remove the question from the jury.1 39
The court's second focus on the misuse was more properly
134. See id. at 375-76, 884 P.2d at 459-60.
135. See id. at 377, 884 P.2d at 460.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 376, 884 P.2d at 460. It is interesting to consider an alternative
characterization of the use of the crane in Lutz. One might assume that the proper
characterization of the use should include the cause of the injury. Although the su-
preme court characterizes the use in Lutz as merely "sideloading," perhaps a more
accurate characterization would be "sideloading below electrical wires." However, the
greater specificity with which the use is characterized, the less likely that it may
reasonably be foreseen.
138. See, e.g., LaRue v. National Union Elec. Corp., 571 F.2d 51, 56 (1st Cir.
1978); Gibbs v. O'Malley Lumber Co., 868 P.2d 355, 359 (Ariz. App. 1994).
139. But see Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 188 (Colo. 1992)
("Defendant's actual awareness of a particular type of misuse involved with its prod-
uct, including knowledge acquired from prior incident reports, may be considered in
determining that the misuse was reasonably foreseeable.").
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considered. This consideration provides for an objective deter-
mination as to whether the particular misuse was reasonably
foreseeable. As noted, this is the proper analysis. In Lutz, the
most important point regarding misuse is that the supreme court
determined that, because the defendant conceded that it could
foresee the misuse of sideloading, sideloading was not an unrea-
sonable misuse per se, and thus the defense of misuse was un-
available as a matter of law.
The court in Lutz then turned to the application of the as-
sumption of risk under the products liability statute. Despite the
legislature's revision of the law, the Montana Supreme Court
indicated that the assumption of risk is still analyzed under a
subjective standard.1" For the assumption of risk to apply un-
der the facts in Lutz, the court found that Lutz actually must
have known that the cable would come in contact with the live
electrical wire, that he would suffer serious injury or death, and
that he voluntarily encountered that danger.""
At trial, the defendant attempted to introduce evidence con-
cerning the plaintiffs knowledge of the potential danger.'"
This evidence included: Lutz's training, including his responses
and understanding in the licensing procedure; his knowledge of
the warning on the crane; his prior instruction regarding crane
safety; his knowledge of the crane manual; his knowledge
gleaned from videotapes; and testimony concerning conversations
that he had participated in before his death." The trial court
limited much of the evidence the defendant attempted to present,
and the supreme court upheld these limitations upon review.4
In applying Montana's new products liability statute, the
Montana Supreme Court in Lutz basically divided the statutory
language into two parts. The first part concerns whether the
plaintiff discovered the defect or whether it was open and obvi-
ous." The second part concerns whether the plaintiff "unrea-
140. See Lutz, 267 Mont. at 378, 884 P.2d at 461 (citing Krueger v. General
Motors Corp., 240 Mont. 266, 783 P.2d 1340 (1989)). This is proper under the statu-
tory phrase "discovered the defect." The supreme court in Lutz did not address the
companion phrase "open and obvious." Presumably, under this language, an objective
test should be used to determine whether knowledge of the defect will be attributed
to the plaintiff. See discussion infra Part V.
141. See Lutz, 267 Mont. at 378, 884 P.2d at 461.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 378-79, 884 P.2d at 461.
145. See id. at 379, 884 P.2d at 461.
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sonably made use of the product.""' The court focused on this
unreasonable misuse in terms of foreseeability. Because the de-
fendant acknowledged foreseeing its product being used in this
particular manner, the court concluded that the use was thereby
not unreasonable. The court reasoned that because sideloading
was a reasonably foreseeable misuse, it could not be considered
as an unreasonable use under the assumption of risk.147 The
Montana Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improper-
ly presented the defense to the jury and removed the portion of
liability assigned to the plaintiff because of the assumption of
risk defense.14 In essence, the court permitted the words "un-
reasonably made use of' to read the defense of misuse back into
the defense of assumption of risk. Thus, because the court found
the misuse reasonable, not only was sideloading with the crane
not a misuse, but the trial court should not have submitted the
defense of assumption of risk to the jury.14
The court's conclusion and analysis in Lutz are erroneous for
several reasons. First, the court erred by limiting the evidence
presented to the jury regarding the plaintiffs knowledge of the
defect and the dangers of electrocution. 5 ° Because the assump-
tion of risk is a subjective test, the plaintiffs knowledge in this
respect is exactly what is at issue. Although the court denied the
evidence in part because it was afraid that the issue of contribu-
tory negligence would be placed before the jury, 1 ' the only ef-
fective way to cure this without eviscerating the defense is
through proper jury instructions.'52 Otherwise, the jury has no
evidence to infer the subjective knowledge of the plaintiff.
Second, the court required Lutz to have had actual knowl-
edge that the accident would occur and that he would be serious-
ly injured.'53 The court appears to have agreed with plaintiff's
counsel who argued that for the assumption of risk to apply, the
146. See id.
147. See Lutz, 267 Mont. at 380, 884 P.2d at 462.
148. See id. at 380, 389, 884 P.2d at 462, 467.
149. See id. at 379-80, 884 P.2d at 461-62.
150. See id. at 378-79, 884 P.2d at 461.
151. See id. at 376-77, 884 P.2d at 460.
152. A simple instruction to the jury could be based on the statutory language of
Montana's product liability statute. This instruction should inform the jury that if
they find the "defective product unreasonably dangerous," then comparative negli-
gence is not a defense for this claim. Additional instruction can reinforce this mes-
sage by stating that the only defenses to a products liability action in Montana are
misuse and the assumption of risk.
153. See Lutz, 267 Mont. at 379, 884 P.2d at 461.
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plaintiff must have had a "death wish."" The specificity of this
knowledge conflicts with the court's own prior holdings. Further-
more, the statute cannot be read to have changed the nature of
the knowledge required. In Krueger, the Montana Supreme
Court correctly stated the level of knowledge required when it
said, "Krueger must have had subjective or actual knowledge
that the truck would roll. This does not require that he have
knowledge of the severity of the injuries he would suffer."55
Accordingly, in Lutz, the court should have merely required that
the plaintiff knew that the cable would touch the wire and that
he would be shocked. To require that he knew that he would be
seriously injured or killed was error. 5 '
Third, the court erred by reading the result of its analysis
under the defense of misuse into the assumption of risk. This
resulted from the court looking to the statutory language, "un-
reasonably made use of the product,"'57 and then focusing on
the foreseeability of the misuse.158 Although, as noted, this is
partly due to the statutory language employed by the legislature,
it does ignore the court's own imposition of a subjective stan-
dard. Thus, the pertinent question remains under the statutory
language: What is the focus of the "unreasonable" misuse under
the assumption of risk?
In this context, it is helpful to return briefly to the defense
of misuse for a proper juxtaposition of the modifier "reasonable."
Under misuse, because an objective test should be applied, the
"reasonability" requirement focuses on the generally foreseeable
character of the particular misuse. However, because the as-
sumption of risk is still defined by the court as a subjective test,
the reasonability requirement must somehow relate to the sub-
jective knowledge of the plaintiff. The proper question in this
context should be whether the plaintiffs use of the product, with
knowledge of the defect (or with the patent condition of the de-
fect), was unreasonable. Thus, the jury should evaluate the
plaintiffs decision to voluntarily encounter the risk with knowl-
edge of the defect under an ordinarily prudent person standard
154. See id. at 379, 884 P.2d at 462.
155. Krueger v. General Motors Corp., 240 Mont. 266, 277, 783 P.2d 1340, 1347
(1989).
156. One should note that this standard is still very high. It will generally be
very difficult to show that someone knowingly subjected themselves to a harm, no
matter how small.
157. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5) (1995).
158. See Lutz, 267 Mont. at 375-77, 884 P.2d at 459-60.
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to determine whether the decision to use the product with this
knowledge was unreasonable.
When the test is properly focused on the subjective knowl-
edge of the plaintiff, the general foreseeability of the misuse in
this context is irrelevant. The particular type of use of the prod-
uct is not at issue under the assumption of risk. Rather, at issue
is the plaintiffs decision to use the product with a particular
subjective knowledge of the defect. Thus, whether the product is
commonly used in this particular fashion or whether the defen-
dant foresaw this misuse is simply not relevant under assump-
tion of risk. To reiterate this point, the question to the jury in
this context should be whether the plaintiffs decision to use the
product with this subjective knowledge was unreasonable, not
whether the type of use was unreasonable.
The Montana Supreme Court has inappropriately intermin-
gled the two affirmative defenses to products liability in Mon-
tana. As clearly pointed out by the three dissenting justices in
Lutz, misuse is based on an objective standard of reasonable
foreseeability, whereas assumption of risk is grounded in the
subjective knowledge of the plaintiff.159 Although the statutory
language may be prone to confusion, allowing the defendant
manufacturer's admission-that it could foresee the particular
misuse of the product-to defeat both affirmative defenses was
an error.
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. Analysis of the Recent Case Law
Montana's product liability statute marks a dramatic shift in
the history of this defense. The legislature apparently anticipat-
159. See Lutz, 267 Mont. at 389-90, 884 P.2d at 468-71 (Gray, J., joined by
Turnage, J., dissenting; Weber, J., separately dissenting). Justice Gray's dissent criti-
cizes the majority's analysis on the assumption of risk as follows:
[Tjhe Court goes to some length to explain that the applicable standard re-
garding [assumption of risk] is the subjective perspective of the user; what
this user knew of the defect and, on that basis, whether this user's use of
the product was unreasonable.
The Court then erases this careful distinction between perspectives by
concluding that because the misuse defense is unavailable as a matter of
law based on National Crane's admitted ability to reasonably foresee the
unloading misuse, so, too is the assumption of risk defense unavailable as a
matter of law. The subjective perspective of the user of the product, on
which the assumption of risk defense is premised, simply disappears at this
point.
Id. at 390, 884 P.2d at 468 (Gray, J., joined by Turnage, J., dissenting).
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ed three possible defenses: 1) misuse; 2) assumption of risk; and
3) patent defects. However, the legislative intent has not been
realized. The Montana Supreme Court has applied the statute in
a manner which focuses on the foreseeability of the plaintiff's
use of the product. When the manufacturer admits foreseeing a
particular misuse of its product, the court has denied all affirma-
tive defenses as a matter of law. This is a harsh result which
contrasts markedly with prior Montana case law and the appar-
ent intent of the legislature.
From a practical standpoint, one should note that the effect
of Hart-Albin and Lutz was to eviscerate nearly all affirmative
defenses in products liability actions. Once the plaintiff has
proved a defective product unreasonably dangerous and the ele-
ment of causation, the matter is essentially closed except for a
damages determination. The supreme court has effectively taken
two statutory defenses that were already narrow and difficult to
prove and heightened the burden to an unrealistic level. This
does not comport with common sense or prior case law.
Although this Article focuses on assumption of risk, a brief
comment concerning the affirmative defense of misuse is in or-
der. There is a difference between what is reasonably foreseeable
and what an individual or party can foresee. For example, it is
reasonably foreseeable that an automobile driver will exceed the
speed limit or not wear her seat belt, but it is not reasonably
foreseeable that a driver may attempt to use his vehicle as a
projectile in attempting to "fly" over a narrow gorge. In the con-
text of this question, one can see that because the query remains
in the objective form, the concept of reasonableness may be ap-
plied to limit the scope of foreseeability.
However, when the question of misuse is transformed into a
subjective inquiry to a specific manufacturer, the element of
"reasonableness" is removed, and the scope of the concept is
greatly enlarged. Again, for example, the scope of the foreseeable
is nearly unlimited when the question is posed to a single entity,
such as a manufacturer: "Could you have foreseen that a vehicle
could be used to "fly" over the gorge?" It can only be bounded by
the reaches of the imagination and is no longer tempered by the
concept of reasonableness. Nevertheless, it is this type of admis-
sion by the manufacturers that the supreme court in Hart-Albin
and Lutz has permitted to remove the defense of misuse as a
matter of law. This reasoning avoids the statutory language that
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refers to "unreasonable" misuse. 6 ° It is one thing for the court
to use the concept of foreseeability to define reasonableness;
however, this use has had the effect of removing the concept of
reasonableness from the inquiry. Once again, retaining the objec-
tive character of the test for misuse is significant to ensure the
law is properly applied.
Concerning the doctrine of assumption of risk, one should
note that even the traditional common law doctrine was narrow
and difficult to prove. As a practical matter, it is difficult enough
to prove that a person knew that she was exposing herself to
danger. However, it is virtually impossible to prove that a person
knew the severity of the resulting injury or that a person had a
"death wish."
161
When this interpretation is combined with reading misuse
into the defense of assumption of risk, little remains of an al-
ready narrow defense. The court's error under the assumption of
risk portion of the statute concerns the application of the phrase
"unreasonably made use of." This analysis should not consider
whether the type of misuse was unreasonable. Rather, the cor-
rect focus is whether the use by the plaintiff with the subjective
knowledge of the defect was unreasonable. 1
2
It is also important to note that the Montana Supreme
Court has yet to address the "open and obvious" language con-
tained in the new statute." Undoubtedly, this will be decided
by the court in the near future. The legislature apparently in-
tended to reverse the Brown decision by implying a plaintiffs
subjective knowledge of a defect when it is patently obvious.
Presumably, even a person exercising a minimal amount of care
would notice a defect that was open and obvious. Thus, this
provision comports with strict liability in tort because this is still
a much lesser standard than that used in comparative negli-
160. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(b) (1995).
161. It is appropriate to remind the reader that these statutory defenses are
apportioned comparatively by the jury. Under this concept, if a plaintiff recognized
that using a product was dangerous and that a certain degree of injury was foresee-
able, a jury could still apportion a minor degree of liability if the actual injury that
occurred was considerably more severe than the plaintiff had assumed.
162. As noted, the test under the statutory language is most properly character-
ized as primarily a subjective test, but with an objective component. The first part of
the test focuses on whether the plaintiff had subjective knowledge of the defect. The
second part of the test focuses on whether the use of the product with this subjec-
tive knowledge was reasonable. The reasonableness of the use with this subjective
knowledge is in turn analyzed as whether a reasonably prudent person would have
used the product with this particularized subjective knowledge.
163. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) (1995).
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gence. The court's treatment of this section in the future should
prove both interesting and significant.
B. Supporting Policy Considerations
The policies behind the adoption of strict liability in tort are
familiar to most practitioners and are frequently recited by the
courts."M These policies include the recognition that the manu-
facturers have placed the goods in the stream of commerce seek-
ing a profit, that they are in the best position to spread the cost
of injuries to users and correct defects, and that users should not
be liable for injuries that are generally not their fault, despite
the fact that a manufacturer used due care.
However, it is important to recognize that the Restatement
Second and the modern courts have adopted strict liability and
not absolute liability. The reason for this limitation on liability is
found in competing policy considerations. If absolute liability
were imposed on manufacturers, it could stifle the manufacture
of many new and beneficial products, denying average consumers
many of the goods they seek. In short, the ripple effects upon the
economy and society from the imposition of absolute liability
could be staggering.
Strict liability is a compromise. The opposing policy consid-
erations are significant. Our society has placed a high value on
business growth, the jobs that it produces, a diversified market-
place, affordable goods, and the introduction of new goods into
the marketplace. Economic growth is critical in our society. It
produces jobs and ultimately results in the introduction of new
and more affordable goods into the marketplace. These compet-
ing considerations weigh against absolute liability. The Montana
legislature recognized these considerations when it enacted the
products liability statute in 1987 and, accordingly, it provided
several defenses. Because the policy considerations in favor of
liability for defective products is strong, these defenses are nar-
row. However, because there are significant opposing consider-
ations, the legislature did provide defenses, and liability for
defective products is not absolute.
In the wake of Hart-Albin and Lutz, products liability is
approaching an absolute. Once a defective product is shown, the
164. See generally Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont.
506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897
(Cal. 1963).
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story is essentially finished. This defeats the intent of the Mon-
tana legislature and ignores the important competing policy
considerations that justify the imposition of strict rather than
absolute liability. It is important that we recognize the compro-
mise that has been made and return to a law that properly re-
flects all the policy considerations involved in these matters.
C. Future Action by the Montana Legislature
A viable solution to the intermingling and evisceration of the
defenses would be for the Montana legislature to re-draft the
statute. Legislative action at this point is appropriate to restore
the original intent of the 1987 products liability statute and to
amend any original drafting errors. Indeed, action is necessary to
restore the policy equilibrium behind adopting strict liability in
tort for defective products.
The important considerations that a new statute should
address have all been outlined previously in this Article. In brief
summary, a new statute should be enacted to ensure the follow-
ing:
(1) The defense of misuse should not be intermingled or con-
fused with the defense of assumption of risk;
(2) the defense of misuse should be based on an objective stan-
dard;
(3) the defense of assumption of risk should be based on a sub-
jective test;
(4) the defense of assumption of risk should not consider the
type of use at the time, but only whether the use was reason-
able in light of the plaintiffs particularized subjective knowl-
edge;
(5) the fact that the defect was open and obvious may be used
to imply that the plaintiff was aware of the defect; and
(6) the open and obvious section of the statute should be sepa-
rated from the other portion of assumption of risk for clarity.
Possible new language for a statute has been supplied in the
footnotes. 6 ' The language supplied in the footnote seeks to ef-
165. Part 5 of the statute could be re-drafted as follows:
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fectuate all of these changes by first placing the "open and obvi-
ous" language into an independent section. Second, the supplied
statute attempts to prescribe the correct objective and subjective
standards for the defenses with specific references to perspective.
Third, in accord with the language of the Restatement Second,
the recommended statute requires that the consumer "discovers
the defect and is aware of the danger."" And fourth, the rec-
ommended statute seeks to prevent misuse from entanglement
with the assumption of risk by defining the term "unreasonably
misused" and removing any reference to this term from the as-
sumption of risk section.
Certainly, different language could accomplish the desired
goals with equal or greater efficacy. This Article seeks only to
generate a discussion among practitioners through an analysis of
the current law and to provide a starting place to correct the
law's present inequities and confusion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the current statutory interpretation by the Montana
Supreme Court, the affirmative defenses available in products
liability actions have been drastically narrowed. The court's focus
is entirely on the foreseeability of the use b1y the defendant man-
ufacturer. If the plaintiff can demonstrate this subjective foresee-
ability, all defenses are removed from the defendant as a matter
of law. This result was not intended by the Montana legislature.
The court's interpretation creates an unfair jurisprudence for the
dfendant manufacturers and vitiates valid policy considerations.
Both the court and the legislature should attempt to remedy this
situation to avoid any future injustice under Montana's law of
products liability.
(5) Except as provided in this subsection ...
(a) The user or consumer of the product discovered the defect and
was aware of the danger, and with this knowledge unreasonably
encountered the danger posed by the defect, which caused or con-
tributed to the injury;
(b) The product defect was open and obvious and a reasonably
prudent person would not have encountered the danger posed by
the defect; or
(c) The product was unreasonably misused by the user or consum-
er and such misuse caused or contributed to the injury. A product
is considered to be "unreasonably misused" when a reasonably
prudent manufacturer would not have foreseen this particular use.
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n. (1965).
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